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I. Introduction
The recent hoopla generated by the Senate’s
examination of income-shifting techniques by
Apple Inc., Microsoft Corp., and Hewlett-Packard
Co.1 reemphasized the central role that foreign
subsidiaries of U.S. multinationals play in tax
avoidance.
For example, the Senate Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations revealed that up to 30 percent of Ap-
ple’s worldwide net profits between 2009 and 2011
were booked to Apple Operations International
(AOI), a wholly owned subsidiary of Apple regis-
tered in Ireland.2 Even though AOI is managed en-
tirely from within Apple’s U.S. headquarters in
Cupertino, Calif., by U.S. employees of Apple,3 AOI
paid absolutely no U.S. corporate tax on those earn-
ings.4 The explanation for that nontaxation is rather
obvious. AOI is not incorporated in the United States
and as such is a foreign corporation for federal in-
come tax purposes.5 Therefore, AOI is not subject to
U.S. corporate tax jurisdiction unless it has income
that is effectively connected with a U.S. trade or
business, which apparently it does not.6
1See Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Committee Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, ‘‘Off-
shore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code — Part 1 (Microsoft
and Hewlett-Packard)’’ (Sept. 20, 2012) (Microsoft and HP
hearing); Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, ‘‘Offshore
Profits Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code — Part 2 (Apple Inc.)’’
(May 21, 2013) (Apple hearing).
2Memorandum to Members of the Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations Re Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax




6See Lee A. Sheppard, ‘‘Apple’s Tax Magic,’’ Tax Notes, May
27, 2013, p. 967.
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Tax avoidance strategies
of well-known U.S. multi-
nationals such as Apple Inc.,
Microsoft Corp., and
Hewlett-Packard Co. have
received much attention re-
cently. Multinationals’ use of
foreign shell entities to shift income away from the
United States is subject to scrutiny. The debate is
primarily about the sourcing of income, not about the
tax residence of the corporate entities involved. That
is hardly surprising, because many view the tax
residenceofcorporationsasmeaningless.Thatmean-
inglessness is occasionally cited to support the adop-
tion of a territorial system of taxation, in which
residence is arguably less relevant for tax outcomes.
This report summarizes some conclusions from a
coming Boston College Law Review article in which
Marian recommends a fresh look at corporate tax
residence. Marian argues that the perception of
meaninglessness is a result of misguided normative
discussion and that it cannot be avoided by adopt-
ing a territorial system. In his report, Marian devel-
ops a functional model under which corporate tax
residence tests are designed to support the policy
purposes of corporate taxation, and the tests are not
independently justified in normative terms. A func-
tional approach suggests that the United States
should adopt a corporate tax residence test under
which domestic corporations for tax purposes are
corporations whose securities are listed for public
trading in the United States, or whose place of cen-
tral management and control is in the United States.
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The idea that a foreign corporation wholly man-
aged and controlled from within a physical location
in the United States has no effectively connected
income is a fascinating tax phenomenon, but beside
the point for our purposes. I am much more in-
trigued by the fact that our tax code willingly
accepts AOI’s foreign status.
AOI was incorporated in Ireland in 1980 and
never had any employees. Its only existence in
Ireland is in the form of a mailbox in Cork. Because
Ireland uses the central management and control
(CMC) tax residence test for corporations, AOI is
not considered Irish for tax purposes. And as al-
ready noted, because the United States uses the
place of incorporation (POI) tax residence test, AOI
is not a U.S. corporation for tax purposes. In other
words, as the subcommittee notes, AOI does not
exist anywhere for tax purposes. It is a figment of
our imagination.
Of course, AOI is only one of many Apple
subsidiaries with little or no real existence that is
registered in some place other than the United
States. And Apple is not alone in its use of foreign
shell entities to facilitate tax avoidance.7
Indeed, one of the recommendations in the sub-
committee’s memo is to fully tax in the United
States the income earned by foreign shell entities
controlled and managed by U.S. parent entities. It is
striking, however, that the subcommittee’s memo
ignores what I believe to be the underlying issue
with AOI: Why do we believe it is foreign in the first
place, and why shouldn’t we change our tax code to
make AOI what it is in substance — namely, a U.S.
corporation?
It seems that when battling offshore income
shifting, our attempt is almost always to target the
income rather than the taxpayer. Our code contains
myriad complex anti-income-shifting regimes and
anti-deferral rules that are designed to support a
U.S. claim to tax income earned by foreign corpo-
rations. Commentators and legislators regularly
suggest (and sometime enact) ways to improve and
strengthen those rules, which is what the subcom-
mittee memo does as well.
Occasionally, bills are introduced to reform the
way we define domestic corporations. But even
then, the thrust of the bills is to battle tax avoidance
rather than accurately define our taxing jurisdiction
over corporations, which in turn cripples those bills.
The reason for this weird approach to corporate
tax residence is apparently that we have no idea
how to meaningfully define the tax residence of
corporations. Corporate tax residence, it is argued,
is a meaningless legal construct.8
Why is corporate tax residence viewed as mean-
ingless, and how can we make it meaningful? In a
forthcoming Boston College Law Review article,9 I
propose a functional approach to the problem.
Namely, I recommend that corporate tax residence
be defined in a way that supports the purposes for
which we tax corporations to begin with. If that
approach is adopted, the United States should
radically reform section 7701(a)(4), which pre-
scribes the POI test. AOI would obviously become a
domestic corporation under a functional view.
Drawing from the forthcoming article, this report
describes why corporate tax residence is perceived
as meaningless. The reason, I argue, is that the tax
residence discussion is guided by an irrelevant
normative debate. I then explain that the ‘‘meaning-
lessness’’ cannot be avoided, as some have sug-
gested, by adopting a territorial tax system. The
report outlines the functional approach to corporate
tax residence, which is based on the notion that
corporate tax residence tests should be instrumental
to the policy purposes for which we tax corpora-
tions. I conclude by questioning which residence
test the United States should adopt under a func-
tional approach.
II. Corporate Tax Residence: Meaningless?
All jurisdictions that impose tax on corporate
entities determine the tax residence of those entities
7See Microsoft and HP hearing, supra note 1.
8Michael J. Graetz, ‘‘The David R. Tillinghast Lecture —
Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated
Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies,’’ 54 Tax L. Rev. 261, 320
(2001); Michael S. Kirsch, ‘‘Taxing Citizens in a Global
Economy,’’ 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 443, 465-467 (2007); Edward D.
Kleinbard, ‘‘The Lessons of Stateless Income,’’ 65 Tax L. Rev. 99,
159 (2011); David R. Tillinghast, ‘‘A Matter of Definition: ‘For-
eign’ and ‘Domestic’ Taxpayers,’’ 2 Int’l Tax & Bus. Law. 239, 267
(1984); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘‘Tax Competition and the Trend
Toward Territoriality,’’ University of Michigan Public Law Re-
search Paper No. 297, 3 (2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2191251.
9Omri Marian, ‘‘Jurisdiction to Tax Corporations,’’ 54 B.C. L.
Rev. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2245802.
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based on either formal tests, such as POI; or sub-
stantive tests, such as CMC, the place where the
corporation’s main economic activity is carried
on,10 and sometimes the place of the shareholders’
residence.11
The preference for one approach over the other is
guided by a normative discussion, which I argue is
irrelevant.
A. Efficiency Arguments
Proponents of a formal approach support their
position with efficiency arguments. Formal tests
such as POI are cost-effective. Unlike the fact-
intensive inquiries required by substantive tests,
POI is an easy test to administer, and it provides
perfect legal certainty.12
More importantly, however, POI is not expected
to distort taxpayers’ behavior in an economically
significant way. Taxpayers are relatively indifferent
about the place of legal incorporation. They are not,
however, indifferent to real economic attributes
such as infrastructure, customer base, and the qual-
ity of the labor force. Thus, the jurisdiction in which
a corporation physically operates (regardless of
whether it is incorporated in the same jurisdiction)
has the benefit of positive externalities such as
direct investment, jobs, and so on. The adoption of
a substantive residency test such as CMC may
encourage migration to another jurisdiction (or
non-investment to begin with) depending on the
factors under which tax residency is determined.
For example, a CMC test may induce management
migration, resulting in the loss of the positive
externalities associated with having a headquarters
within the jurisdiction.13
Thus, under efficiency-based approaches, POI is
a desirable corporate tax residence test because,
unlike substantive tests, it does not cause meaning-
ful behavioral distortion.
Even if true, however, those efficiency arguments
disregard the reality that corporate taxation is a
completely inefficient tax regime.14 Corporate tax is
the source of multiple behavioral distortions, and it
is painful to administer. In spite of that, most
industrialized jurisdictions do tax corporations. Cor-
porate taxation apparently serves purposes other
than efficiency in revenue collection.
If the tax itself is inefficient, why should a basic
qualification for imposition of the tax be efficient? If
one’s ideological goal is to advance efficiency, one
should argue for the abolishment of corporate taxa-
tion altogether (and many do). However, adopting
corporate tax residency models simply because they
are efficient could undermine the ‘‘inefficient’’ pur-
poses of corporate taxation.
For example, if our objective in taxing corpora-
tions is to tax the owners of capital — an admittedly
controversial argument — the POI test completely
defeats that purpose: Apple does not have to
change its behavior in a meaningful way to avoid a
U.S. tax burden on its shareholders. All it has to do
is incorporate AOI offshore and have the income
accumulate in AOI. Thus, POI is efficient in the
sense that we did not distort Apple’s behavior in an
economically meaningful manner (Apple’s head-
quarters is still in Cupertino, exerting positive ex-
ternalities there), yet we have completely defeated
the purpose of taxing Apple’s shareholders on a
global basis. In other words, formal tax residence
tests for corporations pose the risk of defeating the
policy purpose for which we seek to tax corpora-
tions in the first place.
B. ‘Nexus’ Arguments
On the other end of the normative spectrum,
substantive corporate tax residency tests depend
‘‘on some combination of factual elements, such as
the location of the administrative headquarters or
the location of the firm’s center of gravity as deter-
mined by the location of the employees and as-
sets.’’15
Despite the multiplicity of factors considered,
justifications for substantive tax residence tests
share a common theme. Under the substantive
approach, corporate tax residence ‘‘requires a
10Such a test has been adopted in Japan, where a corporation
will be considered domestic for tax purposes if, among other
factors, its principal place of business is in Japan. See Business
Operations in Japan (BNA Portfolio 969-2nd), at VII.A.2.a.
11For a summary of the different factual tests adopted by
civil Law jurisdictions, see Luc De Broe, ‘‘Corporate Tax Resi-
dence in Civil Law Jurisdiction,’’ Residence of Companies Under
Tax Treaties and EC Law 95 (2009).
12Tillinghast, supra note 8, at 260-261; see Daniel Shaviro,
‘‘The Rising Tax-Electivity of U.S. Corporate Residence,’’ 64 Tax
L. Rev. 377 (2011); American Bar Association Section of Taxation,
‘‘Report of the Task Force on International Tax Reform,’’ 59 Tax
Law. 649, 747 (2006).
13Shaviro, supra note 12, at 413-415; ‘‘Tax Reform Options:
International Issues, Hearing Before the U.S. S. Comm. on
Finance,’’ 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of James R. Hines Jr.,
University of Michigan).
14See, e.g., Hines, supra note 13, at 11; Jane G. Gravelle, The
Economic Effects of Taxing Capital Income 75-90 (1994); Avi-Yonah,
‘‘Corporations, Society, and the State: A Defense of the Corpo-
rate Tax,’’ 90 Va. L. Rev. 1193, 1197-1198 (2004); Yariv Brauner,
‘‘The Non-Sense Tax: A Replay to New Corporate Income Tax
Advocacy,’’ 2008 Mich. St. L. Rev. 591, 592 (2008); Richard M.
Bird, ‘‘Why Tax Corporations?’’ Technical Committee on Busi-
ness Taxation, Working Paper 96-1, at 1 (1996).
15Mitchell A. Kane and Edward B. Rock, ‘‘Corporate Taxation
and International Charter Competition,’’ 106 Mich. L. Rev. 1229,
1235 (2008).
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strong nexus with a country,’’16 that ‘‘warrants,
indeed, demands a high level of contribution to the
public finance.’’17
These types of arguments are simply a reformu-
lation of benefits theories under which taxation is
justified as a way to finance public goods. Corpo-
rations, just like individuals, benefit from
government-created public goods, and it is there-
fore justifiable that they pay for them. Thus, fact-
intensive tests focusing on the jurisdiction of the
public goods the corporation enjoys are relevant.
The implicit assumption in nexus-related argu-
ments is that the corporate entity is the true benefi-
ciary of government-created public goods. Under
those arguments, AOI would be viewed as benefit-
ing from some form of public good in the United
States (such as infrastructure and a skilled labor
force that enables AOI to be so successfully man-
aged from Cupertino), and those benefits justify
AOI paying tax in the United States.
However, contemporary corporate tax theorists
generally agree that the ‘‘real entity’’ view of cor-
porations has little, if any, value in explaining why
and how countries tax corporations.18 It is generally
understood that corporate taxes are an instrument
to reach the pockets of individuals.19 And public
finance empiricists seem to agree that ‘‘people, not
corporations, pay taxes.’’20 Granted, we do not
really know who those people are. But we can
agree, I believe, that taxes imposed on corporations
are eventually borne by real people, not by some
imaginary entity.
Thus, the attempt to treat corporations as human
analogs for purposes of nexus determinations is
misguided. If the purpose of corporate taxation is to
serve as a vehicle for taxing individuals, corporate
tax residence tests should be designed to ensure
that the corporate tax eventually burdens the in-
tended individuals, regardless of the nexus of the
corporation. The only relevant nexus is that of the
individuals we seek to tax through the taxation of
corporate entities.
In sum, arguments about nexus are just as mean-
ingless as arguments about efficiency in terms of the
purposes for which we tax corporations. Neither
argument provides a convincing basis for determin-
ing corporate tax residence. With this state of de-
bate, it is hardly surprising that corporate tax
residence is viewed as meaningless.
III. Territoriality Is Not the Solution
The failure to identify convincing normative
bases for corporate tax residence leads some
scholars to suggest we should make tax residence
‘‘unimportant’’ in calculating tax outcomes.21
One way to achieve that is to adopt a territorial
system of taxation.22 Under a territorial system,
corporate tax residence is arguably less relevant for
purposes of calculating tax liabilities, and the mean-
inglessness issue is avoided.23 To be fair, supporters
of territoriality make several other important argu-
ments for adopting territorial taxation, such as
competitiveness and efficiency. However, support-
ers of territoriality still frequently cite the meaning-
lessness of corporate tax residence as a justification
for abandoning our worldwide system.
I argue that the meaninglessness of corporate tax
residence does not convincingly support territorial
taxation, for two reasons.
First, a territorial system would replace the tax-
payer ‘‘residence’’ tax jurisdiction test with the
concept of the source of income. Assuming that
what we truly care about is the meaninglessness of
legal constructs, replacing the jurisdictional concept
of residence with that of source achieves very little.
As several commentators have argued, the concept
of source is just as meaningless as the concept of
residence.24 There is no unifying normative concept
that justifies treating income as derived in one
jurisdiction rather than another. I have little to add
to the mounting volume of literature about the
problem of sourcing income for tax purposes. But in
the context of meaninglessness, all that a territorial
16De Broe, supra note 11, at 95.
17Robert Couzin, Corporate Residence and International Taxation
2 (2002).
18Avi-Yonah, supra note 14, at 1209; Steven A. Bank, ‘‘Entity
Theory as Myth in the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax,’’ 43
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 447 (2001).
19For recent reviews of a century of literature on this issue,
see, e.g., Jennifer C. Gravelle, ‘‘Corporate Tax Incidence: A
Review of Empirical Estimates and Analysis,’’ Congressional
Budget Office Working Paper 2011-01 (2011); Alan. J. Auerbach,
‘‘Who Bears the Corporate Tax Burden: A Review of What We
Know,’’ 20 Tax Pol’y and Econ. 1 (2006).
20Jack Mintz, ‘‘The Corporation Tax: A Survey,’’ 16 Fiscal
Studies 23 (1995); see also ‘‘Does the Tax System Support Eco-
nomic Efficiency, Job Creation, and Broad-Based Economic
Growth?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin.,’’ 112th Cong.
(2011) (statement of professor Michael J. Graetz, Columbia Law
School, quoting Paul H. O’Neill: ‘‘corporations don’t pay taxes,
they collect them’’).
21Shaviro, supra note 12, at 395.
22Graetz, supra note 8, at 320-323; Shaviro, supra note 12, at
415-417.
23Id.
24Kleinbard, supra note 8, at 149; Avi-Yonah, International Tax
as International Law: An Analysis of the International Tax Regime 27
(2007); Lawrence Lokken, ‘‘What is This Thing Called Source,’’
37 Int’l Tax J. 25 (2011); Michael P. Devereux, ‘‘Taxation of
Outbound Direct Investment: Economic Principles and Tax
Policy Considerations,’’ 24 Oxford Rev. Econ. Pol’y 698, 712-713
(2008).
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system can theoretically achieve is the replacement
of one meaningless legal concept with another.
The jurisprudential argument outlined above is
not terribly interesting to the tax practitioner, I dare
to admit. The second argument against the adoption
of territoriality as a solution to the meaninglessness
of corporate tax residence is more interesting: a ter-
ritorial system does not avoid the meaninglessness
of tax residence. Residence is probably as important
in a territorial system as it is in a global system. This
is because the source of income is determined by
reference to the residence of corporate taxpayers in
many important instances.
As any novice international tax practitioner
knows, practically all jurisdictions generally deter-
mine the source of interest and dividend income by
reference to the payer’s residence.25 Gains from the
sale of capital assets — most importantly, the stock
of a corporation — is usually sourced to the resi-
dence of the seller (which may be a corporation).26
Those source rules are a primary facilitator of
intracompany payments, which in turn are the
bread and butter of income-shifting techniques.
Importantly for our purpose, all those strategies
work only because some of the corporations in-
volved in them are foreign, while others are domes-
tic. Corporate tax residence determination thus
remains important even in source-based jurisdic-
tions. The importance of residence is not avoided by
adopting a territorial system of taxation.
In fact, all the recommendations in the subcom-
mittee’s memo touch on safeguards that are in-
tended to prevent shifting income from domestic to
foreign corporations, or to tax income earned by
foreign corporations despite their foreign status.
In our context, the only effect of reforming a tax
system from global to territorial is to change the
function the corporate tax residence performs.
While in a global system residence is an instrument
to define taxing jurisdiction, in a territorial system
residence is an antiavoidance instrument. I leave it
to the reader to decide which is more important. But
it is clear that if we adopt a territorial system, we
can expect an increased incentive for U.S. multina-
tionals to shift income to their foreign subsidiaries.
In other words, residence determination is expected
to play a major role under a territorial system if we
choose to adopt one.
This is hardly a theoretical issue. Most territorial
jurisdictions actually have corporate tax residence
models far more developed than ours, specifically
to combat income shifting.27 Corporate tax resi-
dence is a real issue faced by tax policymakers in
territorial jurisdictions.
In sum, if one wishes to adopt a territorial system
of taxation, one could present several strong, first-
order arguments in support of that system. How-
ever, the meaninglessness of corporate tax residence
is not one of them. If anything, upon the adoption
of a territorial system, corporate tax residence will
be even more important than it is today.
IV. Corporate Tax Residence Functional Model
A. The Functional Approach in Theory
The interim conclusion is a theoretical one: The
normative debate on corporate tax residence does
not produce useful guidance for the formulation of
corporate tax residence models. Moreover, making
tax residence ‘‘less relevant’’ for purposes of calcu-
lating tax liabilities by adopting a territorial system
is wishful thinking.
I have suggested that the reason for that failure is
that the discussion on corporate tax residence is
disengaged from the discussion of the policy justi-
fications for the taxation of corporate entities. My
proposal is therefore to force that engagement. The
design of corporate tax residence models should be
grounded in the notion that a corporate tax resi-
dence is nothing more than an instrument to sup-
port the policies underlying corporate tax laws.
In the forthcoming article, I develop the func-
tional model at length and suggest possible practi-
cal responses to its theoretical difficulties. I discuss
which functional residence models could respond
to four major policy rationales for taxing corpora-
tions: (1) it is a proxy for taxing corporate share-
holders; (2) it is a fee in consideration for the
benefits of incorporation; (3) it is a regulatory
device; and (4) it is a fee paid for access to liquid
capital. In the article, I develop the model by
analyzing each policy rationale individually. Within
each analysis I include possible approaches to
achieve the rationale’s policy goals, and I discuss
critiques of those approaches. I then discuss ways to
simultaneously approach multiple policy rationales
to address the reality that many jurisdictions pursue
multiple policy goals in taxing corporate entities.
Here, however, I focus on the model’s practical
application to U.S. tax laws.
25See Yariv Brauner, ‘‘An International Tax Regime in Crys-
tallization,’’ 56 Tax. L. Rev. 259, 281 (2003).
26Hugh A. Ault and Brian J. Arnold, Comparative Income
Taxation, A Structural Analysis 359 (2011).
27For example, most EU member countries have some form
of territorial or territorial-like system of taxing corporations, yet
corporate tax residence has apparently developed enough there
to justify a whole book dedicated to the issue: Residence of
Companies Under Tax Treaties and EC Law (2005).
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It is important to note at the outset of this analysis
that I assume that the policy choice to tax corpora-
tions on a worldwide basis stands. The meaning-
lessness of corporate tax residence tests has been
used to justify abandoning worldwide taxation in
favor of territorial taxation. Because I argue that the
meaninglessness does not support abandoning
residence-based taxation, I assume that residence-
based taxation is the preferred policy option and that
territorial taxation is only a ‘‘second best.’’ Obvi-
ously, if one prefers a territorial system as a first-
order policy choice, the model will have to be
reexamined. It does not mean, however, that the
model is useless. It means only that the function of
corporate taxation will have to be redetermined and
that the tax residence model may have to be revised
to support the newly determined purpose of corpo-
rate taxation. For example, it would be reasonable to
argue that in a territorial system corporate tax serves
as a proxy to tax earnings of individuals in the ter-
ritory. In that case, corporate tax residency determi-
nations would function as a sourcing mechanism.
B. The Functional Approach in Practice
1. POI fails to support the policy purposes of U.S.
corporate taxation. I start the discussion by explain-
ing why POI, our current corporate tax residence
test, fails to support contemporary policy purposes
of corporate taxation in the United States.
Under a functional view of the corporate tax
residence test, a POI test makes sense if the purpose
for taxing corporations is to charge a fee for the
benefits of incorporation. The theoretical argument
would be that operating in a corporate form confers
benefits, such as limited liability, transferability of
interests, centralization of management, and so on.
Corporate tax might be viewed as a payment in
consideration for those benefits.28 If we believe that
theory, ‘‘the jurisdiction granting the charter and
investing the entity with the legal capacity to earn
income . . . has the right to tax that income when it
arises.’’29
However, in the United States one can easily
achieve all the benefits of incorporation with little
or no corporate tax consequences. Corporate taxa-
tion in the United States, for the most part, is
explicitly an elective regime.
Under the check-the-box regulations,30 only
some entities organized under U.S. laws are treated
as corporations (and thus as domestic corporations)
for federal income tax purposes. Other forms of
business entities — most notably limited liability
companies, S corporations, and partnerships — are
functionally transparent for federal income tax pur-
poses, even though they provide limited liability,
centralized management, and other benefits of in-
corporation to their members.
A 2007 report by the Congressional Research
Service notes that ‘‘liberal rules . . . allow firms to
obtain benefits of corporate status (such as limited
liability) while still being taxed as unincorporated
businesses.’’31 The CRS report also notes a signifi-
cant rise of the share of total business income in the
United States received by unincorporated busi-
nesses since 1980. Among OECD countries, the
United States has almost the largest unincorporated
business sector, second only to Mexico.32
Under those circumstances it probably makes
little sense to argue that in the United States the
purpose of corporate taxation is to tax the benefits
of incorporation. The check-the-box regulations ex-
plicitly grant those benefits without charging any-
thing for them. The only meaningful exception is
publicly traded entities, which are treated as per se
corporations and are not entitled to elect out of the
corporate tax regime.
2. Which tests could support the policy purposes
of U.S. corporate taxation? One could argue that a
POI test is still a good tax residence test if it
supports other purposes for which the United
States taxes corporations. However, this argument
cannot stand. To understand why, a brief survey of
the possible reasons for taxing corporations in the
United States is warranted.
According to U.S. tax scholars, there are at least
four possible justifications (other than the benefits
of incorporation) for imposing corporate taxes in
the United States. I discuss each in turn and dem-
onstrate that those purposes are not supported by
the POI test. In each case I also discuss the residence
test that could support the particular policy pur-
pose.
a. U.S. corporate taxation as a means to regulate
U.S. managers. According to one theory explaining
the emergence of corporate taxation in the United
States, corporate tax as a real-entity measure was
first enacted in 1909, primarily as a regulatory
28Avi-Yonah, supra note 14, at 1205-1206; Kirsch, ‘‘The Con-
gressional Response to Corporate Expatriations: The Tension
Between Symbols and Substance in the Taxation of Multina-
tional Corporations,’’ 24 Va. Tax. Rev. 475, 564-567 (2005).
29Tillinghast, supra note 8, at 259.
30Reg. section 301.7701-1 through -3.
31Jane G. Gravelle and Thomas L. Hungerford, ‘‘Corporate
Tax Reform: Issues for Congress,’’ CRS, at 4 (Oct. 31, 2007).
32In terms of percentages as a share of total businesses
income; see ‘‘Small Businesses and Tax Reform: Hearing on
Small Businesses and Tax Reform Before the Subcomm. on
Select Revenue Measures,’’ 112th Cong. (2011) (testimony of
Robert Carroll of Ernst & Young LLP).
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device.33 The tax reflected negative sentiment in
Congress toward managers of large-scale business
entities34 that accumulated substantial power near
the end of the 19th century. It had been suggested
that ‘‘the imposition of the corporate tax will enable
the government, the shareholders, and the public to
obtain information that will serve as the basis for
restricting such managerial abuses of power.’’35
Under that approach, the 1909 act was an attempt to
restrict managerial power.36
There is little reason to believe that such a policy
purpose is supported by POI. U.S. managers and
entrepreneurs can elect out of having their income-
generating corporations (such as AOI) incorporated
in the United States,37 and thus those individuals
are no longer captured by POI. While there is no
statistical evidence that U.S. individuals tend to
prefer offshore incorporation for their parent com-
panies,38 there is ample evidence that U.S.-
incorporated parent corporations accumulate their
profits not directly, but in subsidiaries incorporated
in low- or no-tax jurisdictions.39
The functionally logical test to adopt, assuming
one seeks to regulate managers, is the CMC test,
adopted by all commonwealth jurisdictions as well
as many other industrialized countries. In recent
years the CMC test has advanced beyond the bogus
and easily manipulated ‘‘place of board meetings’’
test. The place of board meetings is no longer a
decisive factor in the OECD model convention,40
and there is some case law suggesting that the place
of board meetings is no longer a sine qua non for
the determination of the place of CMC.41
CMC is objectionable to some U.S. commentators
on the ground that it may incentivize corporations
to locate their headquarters offshore, resulting in
the loss of the positive externalities to the United
States.42 To the best of my knowledge, no studies
have examined the causative correlation between
the adoption of CMC and real migration of corpo-
rate headquarters (that is, the migration of actual
people and jobs). Even if that migration is real,
under a functional approach it is not necessarily
viewed as a problem. The functional justification for
imposing tax on the expatriating corporation would
be lost. Because the managers are no longer resi-
dents of the jurisdiction, the management regula-
tion argument no longer holds, and nontaxation is
therefore the correct result.
If one still maintains the concern about manage-
ment expatriation, it might be because the real
reason for taxing corporations is not to regulate
managers, but some other reason. In the alternative,
it could simply be that corporate taxes are set at
uncompetitive rates. In that case, the correct re-
sponse is to reduce corporate tax rates, not to create
a loophole in the form of a dysfunctional tax
residence test.
b. U.S. corporate taxation as a means to tax U.S.
shareholders. A second theory explaining the in-
ception of corporate tax in the United States is that
‘‘corporate income tax was originally adopted as a
substitute or ‘proxy’ for taxing corporate share-
holders directly,’’43 and that the 1909 act was simply
part of a continuous attempt to tax shareholders’
wealth accumulated by doing business in corporate
form.44
For the same reasons that POI fails to capture
U.S. managers, it also fails to capture U.S. share-
holders. In the current global environment, there is
no reason for a U.S. shareholder to accumulate
earnings in corporations incorporated in the United
States. Rather, it is much easier (and rational from a
tax planning point of view) to accumulate earnings
33Avi-Yonah, ‘‘Why Was the U.S. Corporate Tax Enacted in
1909?’’ Studies in the History of Tax Law, vol. 2, at 377 (2007);
Avi-Yonah, supra note 14; Marjorie E. Kornhauser, ‘‘Corporate
Regulation and the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax,’’ 66
Ind. L. J. 53 (1990).
34Ajay K. Mehrota, ‘‘The Public Control of Corporate Power:
Revisiting the 1909 U.S. Corporate Tax From a Comparative
Perspective,’’ 11 Theoretical Inq. L. 497, 510 (2010); Bank, supra
note 18, at 508-511 (2001).
35Avi-Yonah, ‘‘Why Was the U.S. Corporate Tax Enacted?’’
supra note 33, at 383.
36Id. at 382-387.
37And indeed, most U.S.-owned corporations in which
profits have been accumulated are foreign entities; see Donald J.
Marples and Gravelle, ‘‘Tax Cuts on Repatriation Earnings as
Economic Stimulus: An Economic Analysis,’’ CRS (May 27,
2011); see also U.S. Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations,
‘‘Repatriating Offshore Funds: 2004 Tax Windfall for Select
Multinationals’’ (Oct. 11, 2011).
38Eric J. Allen and Susan C. Morse, ‘‘Tax Haven Incorpora-
tion for U.S. Headquartered Firms: No Exodus Yet,’’ 66 Nat’l Tax
J. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1950760.
39Supra note 37.
40In the past, where the board met was seen as the decisive
factor in determining the place of management, as expressed in
the previous version of the OECD model tax treaty. See OECD
Committee on Fiscal Affairs, ‘‘Model Tax Convention on Income
and on Capital,’’ at 81 (July 15, 2005). However, in July 2008 the
OECD neglected the place of board meeting presumption and
adopted a much more nuanced (and less clear) test to determine
the place of management. The decision is based on facts and
circumstances. See OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, ‘‘Model
Tax Convention on Income and on Capital,’’ at 77 (July 17, 2008).
41Laerstate B.V. v. Revenue and Costumes Commissioners, [2009]
UKFTT 209 (TC).
42Shaviro, supra note 12, at 414; Hines, supra note 13.
43Bank, supra note 18, at 452; see also Bank, ‘‘Entity Theory as
a Myth in the U.S. Corporate Excise Tax of 1909,’’ Studies in the
History of Tax Law, vol. 2, at 393 (2007) (hereinafter ‘‘U.S.
Corporate Excise Tax of 1909’’).
44Bank, ‘‘U.S. Corporate Excise Tax of 1909,’’ supra note 43, at
395.
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in a mailbox in Ireland that is respected as a foreign
corporation for U.S. federal income tax purposes.
Assuming that corporate taxation is intended to
reach shareholders’ pockets, the logical functional
residence test is a residence-of-majority-of-share-
holders rule, as suggested by several commenta-
tors.45 The main objection to that model is based on
administrative concerns, such as the difficulty of
applying it to publicly traded corporations.46
That administrative concern is overstated. The
concern, presumably, is the headache caused by the
potential for a traded entity to interchangeably and
continuously shift from foreign to domestic tax
status.47 This issue is unlikely to pose a particularly
difficult problem for U.S. tax administration, be-
cause U.S. residents own 87 percent of the aggregate
value of companies traded on U.S. stock markets.48
Although the stock of entities traded on U.S. ex-
changes frequently changes hands, it likely changes
hands between all-U.S. parties most of the time.
Assuming the determination of corporate tax resi-
dence follows the residence of the majority of
shareholders, it is hard to imagine a frequent tax
residency change. If, on average, 87 percent of the
stock is owned by U.S. residents, more than 37
percent of the stock will have to change hands from
U.S. to foreign shareholders for the corporate tax
residence to be affected. Also, ownership determi-
nation could be decided on a time-average basis.
Moreover, the United States already uses legal
models that look through corporations to determine
beneficial ownership for tax purposes, as is done in
determining whether a corporation is a controlled
foreign corporation under subpart F.49 Those mod-
els could be used to determine residence, not just
beneficial ownership.
It has been argued that using the CFC ownership
rules to make the corporate residence determina-
tion is the functional equivalent of eliminating
deferral.50 That is correct, but it is not a convincing
argument against adopting an ownership tax resi-
dence model.
If one believes that worldwide taxation of U.S.
residents is desirable, the argument against the
adoption of a shareholders’ ownership model
amounts to an objection that the model actually
achieves the desired result. That objection does not
respond to the functionality of the ownership test if
the purpose is to tax shareholders on a worldwide
basis. At most, it argues against the purpose the
ownership test intends to serve.
Finally — and most strikingly in my mind — we
already have a model in our code that looks at
shareholders’ residence for purposes of determin-
ing corporate tax residence. I am referring, of
course, to the anti-inversion rules in section 7874.
Section 7874 was added as part of the American
Jobs Creation Act of 2004 to curtail expatriations (or
inversions) of U.S. corporations. Section 7874 pro-
vides among other things that if, after an inversion
transaction, at least 80 percent (in vote and value) of
the stock of a foreign-incorporated entity (and thus
otherwise a foreign entity) is owned by sharehold-
ers of the inverting U.S. corporation, the foreign
corporation is treated as a domestic corporation for
U.S. tax purposes.51 Thus, an explicit model for
corporate tax residence determinations based on
ownership is found in the IRC, and there is no need
to stray far in search of a model.
If we did want to stray afar, other jurisdictions,
such as Australia and Italy, have ownership-
dependent corporate tax residency models.52 Those
models may provide constructive comparative
guidance and are certainly worth looking at before
dismissing an ownership test as unadministrable.
c. U.S. corporate taxation as a means to alleviate
agency problems in U.S. public markets. Some
commentators have suggested that corporate taxa-
tion in the United States is justified as a means to
reduce agency costs arising out of the nonalignment
of interests between managers and shareholders in
publicly traded corporations.53
In the absence of corporate-level tax, a corporate
manager who also holds equity in the corporation is
45Kleinbard, supra note 8, at 160; Robert A. Green, ‘‘The
Future of Source-Based Taxation of the Income of Multinational
Enterprises,’’ 79 Cornell L. Rev. 18, 70-74 (1993).
46Shaviro, supra note 12, at 415; see also ABA tax section, supra
note 12, at 753.
47One could also raise an issue of identifying who the
shareholders are. In today’s tax-reporting environment this is
not a terribly difficult task. Individuals who trade listed securi-
ties typically do so through accounts in financial institutions.
Those institutions typically must identify and keep a record of
the tax residence of the account owners. See, e.g., reg. section
1.441-1(b)(2) in the context of individuals. Identification require-
ment also applies to foreign financial institutions. See sections
1471-1474.
48Kleinbard, supra note 8, at 159; Joe Wiesenthal, ‘‘Chart of
the Day: Here’s Who Owns the Stock Market,’’ Business Insider,
Nov. 30, 2012, available at http://www.businessinsider.com/
heres-who-owns-the-stock-market-2012-11.
49Section 958.
50Shaviro, supra note 12, at 415.
51Section 7874(b).
52A company carrying on business in Australia will be
deemed resident in Australia for tax purposes if shareholders
controlling at least 50 percent of its voting power are Australian
residents; in Italy, a foreign-incorporated corporation that holds
a majority interest in Italian entities and is also majority-owned
by Italian residents is presumed to be a resident in Italy for tax
purposes.
53Hideki Kanda and Saul Levmore, ‘‘Taxes, Agency Costs,
and the Price of Incorporation,’’ 77 Va. L. Rev. 211 (1991).
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likely to prefer her own tax interests when making
corporate-level decisions that affect shareholder-
level tax consequences. Once a tax is imposed at the
entity level, it creates alignment of interests, be-
cause managers and shareholders alike have an
interest in reducing entity-level tax, regardless of
their individual tax interests.54
POI does not support that purpose. There is no
requirement that an entity that is publicly traded on
a U.S. exchange be incorporated in the United
States. Foreign-incorporated corporations (which
may or may not be subject to corporate-level tax in
their home jurisdiction) that are listed for trade in
the United States are not subject to the full reach of
U.S. corporate tax jurisdiction. Agency costs are not
necessarily alleviated in those corporations.
However, a corporate tax residency test based on
the place of listing does achieve the desired result. If
we accept the regulatory role of corporate taxation,
it is a logical extension to treat corporations whose
securities are listed in a U.S. exchange as domestic
for tax purposes.
The main objection to a place-of-listing test is that
it puts the local exchanges at a disadvantage by
creating a tax cost for trading in those exchanges.
There are two possible responses to that concern.
First, if a company is electing out of the exchange,
the agency costs are no longer a concern for the
jurisdiction and need not be regulated through
corporate taxation.
Second, if we still care about corporate migration,
the correct solution would be to lower corporate tax
rates, rather than to punch loopholes in the corpo-
rate tax base by adopting dysfunctional residence
tests.
d. U.S. corporate taxation as a fee for accessing
U.S. public markets. A fourth alternative justifica-
tion for the U.S. corporate tax suggested by scholars
is that the tax is imposed as an access fee to U.S.
public markets.55 To noncontrolling shareholders,
liquidity provides a significant benefit, and corpo-
rate tax can be justified as a fee on liquidity.56
The POI test does not support that purpose,
because foreign-incorporated corporations can
freely list their securities on U.S. exchanges without
a need to incorporate in the United States. The place
of listing, on the other hand, does support the
fee-for-liquidity justification.
Here, too, arguments that a listing fee may hurt
competitiveness are not convincing. Corporate
managers decide where to list based on multiple
considerations. They are buying into a product (the
public exchange) that includes, for example, access
to a specific investor pool and access to a specific
regime of securities regulation. If the price the
managers must pay includes corporate taxes, they
will factor that into their cost analysis.
When managers decide to list in one jurisdiction
and not another, it means the cost of listing in the
second jurisdiction is too high. However, if one
takes seriously the liquidity justification of corpo-
rate tax, it makes no sense to dismiss the place-of-
listing test because it creates costs. We want it to
create costs! This is the very reason to collect
corporate tax under this view — to pay the juris-
diction for creating the public market. If corporate
taxes discourage listing, it means that corporate
taxes are set at uncompetitive rates or that the
product (such as the securities regulation regime)
needs improvement. Again, it does not make sense
to deal with these issues by adopting a dysfunc-
tional tax residence model.
V. Conclusion: Functional Residence of AOI
We end where we started. A significant linchpin
in Apple’s international tax planning is that a
mailbox in Ireland with the label ‘‘Apple Opera-
tions International’’ on it is treated as a foreign
corporation for U.S. federal income tax purposes.
Regardless of whether you prefer worldwide or
territorial taxation, the fact that our tax laws ask us
to treat a mailbox in Ireland as a foreign corporation
is an insult to intelligence.
Treating mailboxes as foreign corporations de-
feats any purposes that could conceivably justify
the taxation of corporate entities in the United
States.
If we want to reach Apple’s shareholders, we
can’t, because their wealth accretion is treated as if
it is happening in Ireland and not as a result of the
deployment of capital in the United States.
If it is the managers of Apple we seek to regulate
through the taxation of corporate entities, we do not
achieve that, because our tax code forces us to
believe that the managers of Apple’s subsidiaries
execute their managerial discretion in a mailbox in
Ireland rather than in an office in Cupertino.
If it is access to the liquid markets we seek to tax
— whether for purposes of regulating agency costs
or as a liquidity fee — we miss that goal unless we
believe that Apple’s NASDAQ listing could not
have happened if it wasn’t for the existence of
mailboxes in Ireland.
Of course, I have to reiterate that Apple is not at
fault here. If the code allows AOI to be treated as
54Id. at 229-233.
55Calvin H. Johnson, ‘‘Replace the Corporate Tax With a
Market Capitalization Tax,’’ Tax Notes, Dec. 10, 2007, p. 1082;
Rebecca S. Rudnick, ‘‘Who Should Pay the Corporate Tax in a
Flat Tax World?’’ 39 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 965 (1989).
56Rudnick, supra note 55, at 1099-1103.
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foreign, Apple’s planning strategy is hardly surpris-
ing (and, at least to the extent of jurisdictional
definitions used by Apple, seems perfectly legal).
The easy (but unnecessary) conclusion is that the
United States could adopt a three-pronged resi-
dence test under which any corporation would be
classified as domestic for federal income tax pur-
poses if it is majority-owned by U.S. residents, if it
is managed and controlled from within the United
States, or if its securities are listed on a U.S. ex-
change. Under that approach, Apple, as well as all
its wholly owned subsidiaries such as AOI, would
be taxed as domestic corporations in the United
States. That is the correct result if we believe
corporate taxation is an instrument to tax specific
individuals on a worldwide basis (for any of the
reasons discussed above).
The three-pronged test could be simplified. U.S.
publicly traded corporations are overwhelmingly
owned by U.S. residents. Whether we use a place of
listing test, or a place of shareholders’ residence
test, we would largely capture the same corpora-
tions under the definition. Under those circum-
stances, the place of listing test will also capture the
U.S. shareholders we presumably seek to tax.
Therefore, there is no need to adopt an ownership
test in the current environment.
Of course, domestic publicly traded corporations
may themselves hold non-publicly traded entities
and channel profits through those entities, avoiding
current worldwide taxation. Thus, entities con-
trolled by corporations whose securities are listed
on a U.S. exchange should also be regarded as
domestic for U.S. tax purposes. As far as I am
concerned, such a test alone would be a great
improvement.
The issue is more elaborate in the context of
regulating managers. If we are worried only about
managers of publicly traded entities accumulating
excessive power, the place of listing test would
work as well. However, with the lack of measurable
data about power accumulation in private versus
public entities, the CMC test is also needed.
For example, in the absence of the CMC test, a
domestically listed entity could exert its ‘‘excessive
power’’ through the use of a non-listed affiliated
entity. It is therefore necessary to ensure that the
members of an affiliated group are all treated as
residents in the same jurisdiction for corporate taxa-
tion to properly function as a regulation mechanism.
The bottom-line recommendation of the forth-
coming Boston College Law Review article is that the
United States adopt a test under which (1) corpora-
tions managed and controlled from the United
States and (2) corporations whose securities are
listed on an exchange in the United States (or
corporations controlled by a corporation whose
securities are listed on an exchange in the United
States) will be treated as domestic corporations for
federal income tax purposes.
Several bills have suggested similar tests,57 but I
do not believe they achieve the desired result.
Under those bills, a foreign-incorporated corpora-
tion will be treated as domestic for tax purposes if it
is managed and controlled from within the United
States, and (1) it has $50 million or more in aggre-
gate gross assets under management or (2) it is
publicly traded in an established securities market.
That suggestion falls short of achieving the pur-
poses of U.S. worldwide corporate taxation. For
example, if foreign-managed corporations are ac-
cessing the U.S. liquid markets, they will avoid U.S.
domestic classification. This in turn means that the
access to liquidity and the agency-cost-related pur-
poses of corporate taxation are not fulfilled.
It seems that the corporate tax residence bills fall
slightly short of the desired results because they are
driven by the second-best set of considerations —
namely, preventing tax avoidance. The bills, I be-
lieve, fail to consider the primary issue that should
guide us in determining the residence of corporate
entities: achieving the policy purposes of world-
wide corporate taxation.
It is easy to imagine the pushback to my suggested
approach from competitiveness enthusiasts. The re-
sponse is twofold. If you still believe in worldwide
taxation, you should support the adoption of a func-
tional model and at the same time argue for a re-
duction in corporate tax rates. The system we now
use for corporate residence is not a problem from the
point of view of rate competitiveness. Rates can be
reduced. The current system is simply a flawed in-
strument that defeats our worldwide system of taxa-
tion and creates, as noted by Edward D. Kleinbard,
what is in effect a territorial system.58
If one believes in a territorial system as a policy
matter — well, that is a whole new story. The
dysfunctionality of corporate tax residence is not,
however, a convincing argument to adopt a territo-
rial system. If we prefer a territorial system, we
would need to rethink the purposes of corporate
taxation. For example, one could conceivably view
corporate taxation as a proxy to territorial taxation,
in which case one would have to come up with a
corporate residence test that supports that purpose.
I leave that inquiry for another day.
57S. 268, Cut Unjustified Tax Loopholes Act, section 103,
113th Cong. (2013); S. 2075, Cut Unjustified Tax Loopholes Act,
section 103, 113th Cong. (2012); H.R. 62, International Tax
Competitiveness Act of 2011, section 2, 112th Cong. (2011); S.
1346, Stop the Tax-Haven Abuse Act, section 103, 112th Cong.
(2011).
58Kleinbard, supra note 8, at 700.
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